

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An analysis of current international events*



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## ***Conflicting Administration Views Impede U.S. Policy***

WASHINGTON — The sense of confusion which characterizes current American private thinking about foreign relations exists also in Washington. When one high official in the executive branch of the Federal government comments gloomily about the world situation, the public can be sure that soon another official will comment about it rosily. The sole point on which all agree is in opposing any recommendations that we negotiate with the Soviet Union in a concession-making spirit of give and take.

At the moment the Administration as a whole is unfriendly to the proposal which Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations, made after visiting Moscow May 12 to 15. Mr. Lie suggested that the United States, Britain and France, acting in their status of permanent members of the UN Security Council, confer with the Soviet Union respecting the admission of Communist China to the UN. While it is clear what the United States for the present will not do, so long as the Administration contradicts itself no official can say with confidence what positive steps the country will take in meeting the rapidly changing problems of world affairs. The real meaning of the decisions which Secretary of State Dean Acheson reached in London in his conference with the other North Atlantic pact powers is thus left up in the air.

### ***Why Officials Disagree***

The disagreement among executive officials whose decisions and statements directly affect foreign policy arise from their divergent interests. President Truman

stresses the accomplishments of his Administration in order to persuade the voters that they would be wise to return Democratic majorities to Washington in the elections next November, and foreign policy falls under the heading of "accomplishments." Optimistic Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson is the chief author of existing military policy, which he imposed on the Navy and Air Force by halting construction of a large carrier and by limiting the size of the Air Force to 48 groups. He is clearly not in a position, therefore, to be anything but optimistic concerning the ability of the military establishment created by his policy to deter Russian military aggression.

His subordinate officials, however, foresee danger. General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in a public address in San Francisco on May 19 that "in a few years we and our friends may have to face the reality of Russian atomic strength." On the same day General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, said that the present Air Force, limited by the Johnson policies, could survive only a few months in a steady aerial war. Secretary Acheson echoes the concern of the generals and not the confidence of the President and Secretary Johnson because, among other reasons, he is said to feel that Americans must be aroused to understand the Soviet Union will be a menace to us unless we constantly enhance our strength.

These divergences unsettle Mr. Acheson's position, especially because the military policy which Secretary Johnson has been following differs from the mil-

itary policy the United States presumably supported in approving the Atlantic Council communiqué of May 18. The Council representatives "urged their governments to concentrate on the creation of balanced collective forces in the progressive build-up of the defense of the North Atlantic area." Yet the 1951 appropriation bill for the American military establishment which Congress is in process of approving carries forward the system of balanced national forces which was devised by the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, and has been retained by Secretary Johnson.

### ***London and Congress***

In London Mr. Acheson accepted the thesis which General Bradley stated on April 14, that "our own balance of United States forces—if we expand beyond the present levels—may have to give way to the theory of national specialization." Neither President Truman nor Secretary Johnson is encouraging serious expansion of the military establishment "beyond the present levels." Mr. Johnson requested an increase of \$350 million in the military expenditures which the Administration had computed would be necessary for 1950-1951, and this was accepted by the House Appropriations Committee on April 26, but it represents a minor addition to a military budget which now totals \$14,464,460,000. Although the London communiqué suggests the desirability of a much larger Navy and Air Force than we now possess, such changes have not yet been officially recommended in Washington.

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The contradictions in official opinion further disturb the prospect for implementing the London decisions because the absence of harmony weakens the Administration in its relations with Congress. In the following respects the decisions will probably mean only what Congress permits them to mean:

1. The idea of "balanced collective forces" implies that a "small bit of sovereignty is relinquished," to quote General Bradley. By their willingness to add to the military appropriations, leading Congressmen have signified their support for strong national defense. The House of Representatives, moreover, on May 24 voted 216 to 11 to continue until June 24, 1952 the Administration's authority to register for military service men between 18 and 26 (the Senate has not yet acted on the bill). But in many matters concerning American cooperation with other powers in the United Nations specialized agencies—with the notable exception of atomic energy control—Congress has disclosed its opposi-

tion to the slightest abandonment of sovereignty.

2. The idea of "balanced collective forces," moreover, means that our allies should increase the size of their military establishments. Yet after the conference of the Atlantic pact defense ministers at The Hague in April, a number of allied governments tentatively concluded that it would be impossible for them to finance an expansion of their military forces. The London communiqué noted that "further mutual assistance is essential to rapid progress toward the strength required for the common security of the North Atlantic area." If the allies cannot afford that "rapid progress," the suggestion may soon be heard that the United States finance it for them. Congressional willingness to authorize American spending abroad, in spite of the strong protests of the economy-minded, was emphasized on May 26 by Senate approval of the \$3 billion foreign aid program—including the inauguration of the Point Four plan for

helping underdeveloped countries—but Congress has not indicated that it would approve a program for helping our allies maintain their military forces beyond the grants of matériel entailed in the Military Assistance Program.

Since Secretary Acheson is treating the Atlantic alliance as the core of American foreign policy, disagreements affecting the implementation of the alliance jeopardize the whole concept of the policy. As long as Mr. Truman and Mr. Johnson point to blue skies and clear horizons, other speeches designed to arouse the public and Congress to turn new foreign policy suggestions into concrete reality may not achieve their goal. If Congress declines to accept the suggestions written in the London communiqué, it can at least use the communiqué as a basis for reassessing the American course abroad, with a view to determining whether or not military arrangements have come to hold too large a place in our foreign policy.

BLAIR BOLLES

## ***Will Schuman Plan Contain Revived Germany?***

Although the widely publicized Whitsuntide parade staged by the Communists in the Eastern sector of Berlin went off without major incidents, contrary to dramatic predictions in the American press, the mutual denunciations hurled by East and West in Germany's former capital have further accentuated the new position of influence acquired by the Germans following the London conferences.

For the second time in one generation Germany, like the legendary phoenix, is rising from the ashes of wars it had precipitated. Five years after what was once regarded as their ultimate defeat, the Germans are in an enviable position. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer can speak of the "pro-German policy" of the United States, and both the Western powers and the U.S.S.R. vie for the support of the Germans, offering them everything from national unity to financial investments, from opportunities for political and economic leadership on the continent to rearmament in one form or another.

### ***France's Reinsurance***

Of the four occupying powers, France, three times invaded by Germany in eighty years, is the only one which has seen in the round the problem created by the comeback of the Germans and has acted to meet it without either sentimentality or

illusion. The French have come to the conclusion that, while the United States is not only ready but eager to help defend Western Europe against Russia, it is not only unwilling to take measures that would genuinely prevent the restoration of a militant German state but is sorely tempted to revive Germany's industrial power, and even possibly its military potential, as a bulwark or spearhead in the struggle to check Russia and communism. Under these circumstances, what looks to Americans like Atlantic defense measures against Moscow might all too easily, if Germany is eventually included in them, become a renewed German threat to France.

Meanwhile, the French, unlike the British and Americans, have not underestimated the tremendous drawing power of unification on the imagination of the now divided Germans. They have foreseen with lucid horror the possibility that much as the Germans may dislike Russia and communism, they might ultimately make a deal with the U.S.S.R., first, to win unity and then to win outlets for the products of their revived industries not only in Eastern Europe and Russia but also in Asia. A German-Russian combination might conceivably, at least for the time being, avert a third world war, to the dangers of which the United States is try-

ing to arouse Europe, and thus at least spare France another period of devastation. But it would also give reality to the French nightmare that the Germans and Russians, fusing industrial techniques with dynamic ideology and totalitarian methods, would wipe out the heritage of Western civilization of which France continues to regard itself as residuary legatee.

### ***Schuman Plan Many-Faceted***

The Schuman plan for a Franco-German pooling of coal and steel production is skillfully devised to give France at least three forms of insurance against anticipated disasters. First, by offering to "mix up" the raw materials that serve as the sinews of modern war, the French hope to acquire a degree of control over the use of the resources of the Ruhr which they saw no possibility of obtaining under existing Allied control machinery where the United States might prove increasingly lenient to German demands for increased steel output. Moreover, Foreign Minister Schuman proposes that a United Nations representative be attached to the Franco-German organization that would administer the pool, reporting twice a year to the United Nations "on the functioning of the new organization, especially with respect to the safeguard of its pacific aims." Thus any designs the Germans might

have for remilitarization would be examined not in the privacy of discussions between French, British and American authorities, but in the full glare of a world forum.

Second, the Schuman plan specifies that the proposed coal-steel organization would be open to the participation of other European nations, including, presumably, those of Eastern Europe. In explaining his plan at a press conference on May 9, the French Foreign Minister said: "We have established contact with the countries to which we are closely linked. This does not imply any prejudice with respect to certain European countries, whatever the distance that separates us from the nations to the east." The French, apparently, want to make sure that if economic connections are to be established between Germany and Russia, France will be an active participant in these connections and not an isolated and anxiety-ridden bystander.

Third—and from the American point of view most important—the Schuman plan looks toward increased productivity and improvement, not mere maintenance, of living standards in the participating countries. It is clearly keyed to expectation of peace, not of war. It reflects the deep-seated desire of the French to avoid another world conflict by placing the emphasis of the Atlantic community on efforts to remove the economic maladjustments that foster communism rather than on military measures of defense in case of Russian aggression.

### ***Trade Unions and the Pool***

In view of its many-faceted approach to both the German and Russian problems, it is not surprising that the Schuman plan has been hailed for very different reasons on the two sides of the Atlantic. American spokesmen have welcomed it as a major step toward the integration of Europe urged by Washington and as a sign of revived interest in free enterprise—without realizing, apparently, that genuine application of the pooling scheme would require elaborate planning on a regional or even continental scale and would call for the application of drastic national controls. Political and industrial leaders in Bonn have seen in the Schuman proposal an opportunity to restore full control of coal and steel enterprises to their former owners, to raise existing levels of German steel production and to share in the development by France of African territories. European trade unions, including those of Germany, have

expressed approval of increased productivity but have insisted on participating in the new organization on a basis of equality with employers, and in this they have received vigorous support from the French government. The French Socialists, at their Paris conference from May 26 to 28, made inclusion of Britain in the proposed pool a fundamental condition for their acceptance of the Schuman plan. The British Labor government, however, remains wary of the pool for fear of the effect it might have on the domestic wage and price structure.

It is on this crucial issue of trade-union participation that the future possibilities of the coal-steel pool, for ill or good, will depend. For if all that is accomplished is to restore the power of the German industrialists who backed Hitler and did not hesitate to support war as a method of enlarging Germany's "living-space," then the Schuman plan may only serve to assure the post-mortem success of Hitler's dream for the creation of a German industrial empire in Europe. Today in Germany a political democracy that is still largely on paper serves only as a facade for the real sources of power which, as in the days of Kaiserism and Nazism, remain in the hands of great industrialists who do not hold themselves accountable to the people or their parliamentary representatives.

The Social Democrats and the trade unions have sought to close this gap between politics and economics by urging the participation of workers' and consumers' representatives along with employers in decisions about the use of Germany's industrial resources. Hitherto United States representatives in Germany, in spite of pleas by American labor observers, have been notably cool to these proposals. Yet changes in social controls would be far more effective in democratizing Germany, within the frame of its historical traditions, than either denazification, which has admittedly proved unsuccessful, or "re-education," which when carried out by foreign educators representing a victorious nation meets with the same kind of resistance that the Germans would have encountered had they tried to "re-educate" us. This, of course, assumes that other groups in Germany will not be as affected by considerations of militant nationalism and desires for territorial expansion as proved true of big-industry leaders. If the Schuman plan accomplishes nothing else, it will have brought out with startling clarity the need to alter the bases

of German society before the structure of any new European organization can be securely superimposed upon it.

While attention has been focused on events in London, Paris, Bonn and Berlin, Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations, has sought, without fanfare, to ascertain the possibilities of ending Russia's nonparticipation in international organizations and of resuming discussion of far-reaching issues—from China to control of atomic energy—in an international forum.

### ***What Will Russia Do?***

During the past few months it has become increasingly clear that the U.S.S.R. is consolidating its position in the countries of Eastern Europe, both through tightening up of security and military measures and through efforts to stamp out attempts of Communist leaders to follow the example of Marshal Tito. Meanwhile, Russia has been multiplying its activities in Asia, where rising nationalism, revolt against remnants of colonial rule as well as against native oligarchies, and economic distress combine to facilitate the spread of Communist influence. The possibility that Mr. Lie, as well as Dr. Gunnar Myrdal, executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe who visited Moscow at approximately the same time as Mr. Lie, may have alleviated some of Russia's fears was seen in a communication made public on May 30 in which the U.S.S.R. stated it has "favorably received" a proposal of the commission for a European grain agreement.

Although not all the decisions arrived at in London have been made public, the United States has apparently decided to inaugurate in Southeast Asia a Truman Doctrine policy, on a modest financial scale. Judging by reports from the Baguio conference of Asian nations, called by the Philippine government on May 26, the key countries of Asia—like some of the key countries of Europe—see their best insurance against communism not in military measures but in economic, social and cultural reforms. It is thus being borne in on us more clearly every day that communism will not be defeated by mere maintenance of the *status quo*; and that both in Europe and Asia we must make up our minds as rapidly as possible not only concerning what we are against but also what we are for. VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The second of two articles on the London, Paris, Bonn and Moscow conferences. American policy toward Asia as formulated at the Big Three meeting in London will be discussed in the next issue.)



## FPA Bookshelf

### Recent Books on Europe

*The Curtain Isn't Iron*, by Joseph C. Harsch. New York, Doubleday, 1950. \$2.00.

The Washington correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*, formerly a foreign correspondent of that newspaper for many years, contends, on the basis of a recent survey of Eastern Europe, that the situation there is far from being as crystallized as it sometimes looks from here. The United States, in his opinion, has a good opportunity to regain influence in that area—but only if it seeks to check Russia's national aspirations, not if it hopes to undo post-war social changes and restore the *status quo ante*.

*Escape to Adventure*, by Fitzroy Maclean. Boston, Little, 1950. \$4.00.

A young British diplomat recounts his experiences from Moscow through Asia and Africa to wartime Yugoslavia, where, as Churchill's envoy to Marshal Tito, he plunged with zest into the hardships and excitement of guerrilla warfare. His gay and witty, yet in many ways politically shrewd, book proves that for those who welcome adventure, romantic opportunities exist even in the modern industrialized world.

*Europe and the United States* by Vera Micheles Dean. New York, Knopf, 1950. \$3.50.

This book traces the development of Europe, from nation-state to the United Nations, from imperialism to commonweal, from *laissez-faire* to welfare state, and analyzes the new relations between Europe and the United States forged by the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic pact, our pleas for European integration and current attempts to create an Atlantic community.

*Decision in Germany*, by General Lucius D. Clay. New York, Doubleday, 1950. \$4.50.

The personal report by the Military Governor of the American zone of occupation in Germany, written in forthright style, is "must" reading, especially at a time when the principal policies carried out by General Clay are being put to a crucial test. General Clay looks to the emergence of "a self-supporting and self-responsible" Germany, but does not minimize the problems involved in efforts to reintegrate a former enemy into the European community.

*The United States and Europe: A Bibliographical Examination of Thought Expressed in American Publications During 1949*. Washington, Library of Congress, European Affairs Division, 1949. \$1.30.

This excellent analytical survey of articles, pamphlets and books on relations between the United States and Europe published during the past year should prove of great value to students of international affairs. The selection has been made from the point of view of ready availability to the American reader.

*The United States in World Affairs, 1948-1949*, by John C. Campbell and the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations. New York, Harper, 1949. \$5.00.

Concentrating on American policy toward Europe and Germany in a world torn by the cold war, the latest volume in the Council on Foreign Relations' annual series brings into focus the political developments of another year affecting all parts of the globe, as well as special economic and military problems. A selected bibliography and chronology of world events add to this 600-page work's reference value.

## News in the Making

**INDONESIA TO CONSOLIDATE:** As all but two of the sixteen parts of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (R.U.S.I.), established under the terms of The Hague Round Table agreements of November 2, 1949, have acceded to the Republic of Indonesia—the major constituent state—the stage was set for an agreement to form a unitary state of Indonesia, which was signed by the Prime Ministers of the Republic and the R.U.S.I. on May 19. Consolidation is expected to be carried out in about two months.

**JAPANESE TREATY PROSPECTS:** While the United States and the Soviet Union jockey for position to obtain the greatest possible advantages from a peace treaty with Japan, the Russians on May 28 withdrew forty-nine high members of their Japanese mission—including its chief, Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyanko. The United States, meanwhile, announced forthcoming trips to Tokyo by General Omar N. Bradley, Defense Secretary Louis Johnson and the State Department's Republican adviser, John Foster Dulles, who has been placed in charge of the State Department's preparations for the treaty.

**FRENCH SOCIALIST PLANS:** France's So-

cialist party, meeting in national congress in Paris from May 26 to 29, rejected proposals to re-enter the coalition cabinet from which it withdrew on February 4. The Socialists, however, appeared ready to continue parliamentary support of the Bidault government on condition that certain policies affecting social security, full employment and denial of state aid to Church schools are maintained. Parliamentary dissolution may thereby be delayed until the next regularly scheduled elections, which must be held before November 1951. The Congress also adopted a resolution demanding the withdrawal of troops from Viet Nam, submission of the Indo-China question to the UN and the admission of the Peiping Communist government to the UN as the actual controlling authority in China.

**UN UNIT HOPEFUL:** The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, in its annual Economic Survey released on May 25, finds grounds for modest optimism in the current economic situation. Increased productivity within Europe and greater stability in the United States economy account for the brighter outlook. In contrast to the ECA point of view, the experts believe that freedom from controls will follow rather than precede the solution of the dollar problem.

## Branch and Affiliate Meetings

PITTSBURGH, June 6, *Annual Meeting*,  
Three March of Time films

PHILADELPHIA, June 7, *Dinner in honor*  
*of Senator Brien McMahon*

ST. LOUIS, June 14, *Report on India and*  
*Pakistan*, Phillips Talbot

*History of the National Economy of Russia to the*  
*1917 Revolution*, by Peter I. Lyaschenko. New  
York, Macmillan, 1949. \$13.00.

This scholarly work, used as a textbook in economics courses of Soviet universities, is written from the Marxist point of view by a leading Russian economist whose reputation had been well established before the Bolshevik revolution. In a brief introduction Professor Calvin B. Hoover states that the author has written "with very much the kind of documentation which would be expected of a distinguished bourgeois economic historian writing a textbook for use in advanced classes." The excellent translation by L. M. Herman of the United States Department of Commerce is one of the works published under the Russian Translation Project of the American Council of Learned Societies.

## Revolutions in the Making

The Baguio conference of seven South Asian nations—all but one of whom attained their independence since World War II—highlights the conspicuous role which once dependent peoples may now be expected to play in world affairs. The same forces which broke the ties of empire in South Asia are today at work in Africa, Oceania and the Caribbean. What results may be expected from this great tide of pressure for self-government in the remaining colonies, trusteeships and protectorates? What role will the United Nations play in these developments? READ:

WARDS OF THE UN: TRUST AND  
DEPENDENT AREAS

by Fred W. Riggs  
June 1 issue

*Foreign Policy Reports*—25¢

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